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Sammendrag 
Gitt dystre utsikter til å få på plass en global klimaavtale, øker presset for unilaterale 
(nasjonale/regionale) utslippsreduksjoner. En viktig utfordring er karbonlekkasje. Karbontoll og 
produksjonsbasert tildeling av kvoter kan øke effektiviteten av unilateral karbonprising, men kan også 
slå uheldig ut. Vi vurderer ulike virkemidler for å redusere karbonlekkasje som følge av karbonprising, 
og ser på hvordan effektiviteten av virkemidlene avhenger av hvor mange land som støtter opp om en 
felles karbonpris. Vi bruker først en partiell likevekstsmodell for å se hvordan de ulike virkemidlene 
påvirker utslippene i land med og uten karbonpris. Deretter bruker vi en detaljert generell 
likevekstmodell for å studere dette mer inngående. Vi finner at en kombinasjon av karbontoll og 
eksportrefusjon er det mest kostnadseffektive virkemidlet, fulgt av kun karbontoll og dernest 
produksjonsbasert tildeling av kvoter. Effektivitetsgevinsten av virkemidlene avtar etter som flere land 
innfører karbonprising. Mens karbontoll er mest gunstig for de landene som innfører dette (som 
supplement til karbonprising), er produksjonsbasert tildeling gunstigst for landene uten klimapolitikk. 
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1. Introduction 
At the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancún, the world community agreed on the objective of 
limiting the rise in global average temperature to no more than 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels 
to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The target implies drastic 
global emissions reductions over the next decades of roughly 50 percent compared to 1990 levels 
(IPCC 2007). Given the increasing share of the developing world in global anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions, the 2° Celsius target cannot be achieved without substantial abatement contributions 
from major developing regions, such as China or India. At the same time, because high-income 
industrialized countries historically had (and still have) much higher per-capita emissions than low-
income developing countries, it seems inevitable that industrialized countries take a leading role in 
short- to mid-run abatement efforts before the developing countries will follow suit. 
 
The increasing pressure for unilateral action manifests itself in various domestic climate policy 
initiatives by industrialized countries. Most notable is the European Union’s Climate Action and 
Renewable Energy Package, which calls for unilateral greenhouse gas emissions reductions in 2020 by 
at least 20 percent compared to 1990 levels and by 30 percent if other developed countries commit 
themselves to comparable reduction targets (European Union 2008). These targets were put into legal 
force in December 2008. In a similar vein, there are policy proposals in other OECD regions with 
substantial unilateral emission reduction pledges over the next decades. 
 
A major challenge in the design of unilateral climate policies is the appropriate response to the threat 
of emissions leakage—that is, the increase in emissions in nonabating regions as a reaction to the 
reduction of emissions in abating regions (e.g., Hoel 1991; Felder and Rutherford 1993). Emissions 
leakage can occur when energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries in countries with emissions 
ceilings lose competitiveness, thereby increasing emissions-intensive production in unconstrained 
regions. Leakage also occurs when emissions constraints in larger open economies depress the demand 
for fossil fuels and thus induce a significant drop in world energy prices, which in turn could lead to an 
increase in the level of energy demand in other regions. 
 
To reduce leakage and thereby increase cost-effectiveness, various instruments are considered to 
complement unilateral emissions pricing. One policy measure is based on border carbon adjustments. 
On the import side, a tariff is levied on the embodied carbon of energy-intensive imports from 
nonabating regions assessed at the prevailing carbon price. On the export side, energy-intensive 
exports to nonabating countries get a full refund of carbon payments at the point of shipment. Full 
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border adjustment would combine adjustments for imports and exports, effectively implementing 
destination-based carbon pricing (Whalley and Lockwood 2010).  However, most policy proposals to 
date focus only on import adjustments. 
 
Another option is output-based rebates (under a fixed carbon price) or allocation of emissions 
allowances (under a fixed quota) to EITE sectors. The rebate, or the value of additional allowances, 
functions as a subsidy to production (Böhringer et al. 1998). In this way, eligible sectors preserve 
competitiveness compared to unregulated industries abroad, thereby reducing leakage. 
 
Border carbon adjustments and output-based rebates introduce distortions of their own but may be 
justified on efficiency grounds as second-best measures complementing unilateral emissions pricing. 
The attractiveness of these additional measures and their relative ranking in terms of global cost-
effectiveness hinge on the magnitude of emissions leakage: the environmental effectiveness of output-
based rebates and border carbon adjustments would drop to zero if the coalition of abating countries 
comprised the whole world. Whereas border carbon adjustments in this case would automatically 
become inactive, output-based rebates to energy-intensive industries might continue to induce excess 
costs of emissions abatement compared to the first-best option of uniform emissions pricing alone.  
 
Beyond the global cost-effectiveness dimension, abating countries may face quite different cost and 
emissions implications of antileakage instruments based on their specific trade, production, and 
consumption patterns (Fischer and Fox 2009; Böhringer et al. 2010). This immediately raises the 
question if individual countries joining some abatement coalition would easily agree on an antileakage 
strategy. 
 
While the economic impacts of border adjustment measures and output-based rebates have been 
addressed for a fixed number of abating regions, we are not aware of any study that assesses the 
implications of these antileakage instruments as a function of the abatement coalition size toward more 
comprehensive coverage of global emissions. In this paper, we first develop a partial equilibrium 
analytical framework to gain generic insights on how three alternative antileakage instruments — 
output-based rebates, border adjustments for imports, and full border adjustment — affect emissions 
inside and outside the abatement coalition as it increases in size. We then perform numerical 
simulations using a large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international trade 
and energy use to quantify the differential cost implications across the three strategies in an empirical 
setting. 
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We find that of the three instruments, full border adjustments are the most effective to reduce leakage. 
In theory, output-based rebates can be more effective than import adjustments alone when goods are 
stronger substitutes and the coalition size is sufficiently small. However, the parameterization of our 
CGE model with empirical data finds a robust ranking: In terms of global cost-effectiveness (being 
agnostic on the regional distribution of costs), unilateral action achieves a given worldwide emissions 
reduction at lowest cost with full border adjustment, but the cost advantage vis-à-vis tariffs is small. 
The relative performance between these two instruments remains robust as the coalition size increases. 
Output-based rebates achieve the smallest cost savings among the three antileakage instruments 
compared to a reference climate policy that places a uniform price on carbon without additional 
leakage measures. Furthermore, they induce excess costs as the coalition size increases toward full 
coverage because the distortions of output subsidies prevail, while the antileakage effect becomes 
zero.  
 
Depending on the trade characteristics of the coalition, it might prefer import tariffs over full border 
adjustments to increase the coalition’s indirect welfare gains from terms-of-trade shifts. This ranking 
reverses if we take the complementary perspective of countries outside the abatement coalition. The 
latter clearly prefer output-based rebates over full border adjustments or tariffs. Output-based rebates 
induce economic implications that are more similar to those triggered by unilateral climate policies 
without antileakage instruments. While they might be least controversial in the international policy 
debate, they also are the least cost-effective from a global perspective. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
We develop a simple partial equilibrium framework to illustrate important economic mechanisms that 
drive emissions leakage for alternative unilateral climate policies. The main driver is the change in the 
pricing of emissions inside and outside the abatement coalition. Another important leakage 
determinant is the responsiveness to differential emissions pricing captured through own-price and 
cross-price elasticities in demand. 
2.1 Analytical Model 
Let there be n countries, each producing one good. Demand ikq  in country i for the good produced in 
country k exhibits constant elasticities with respect to prices ijp  prevailing in country i for good j, 
where the elasticities are ikjη  for country i consuming good k with respect to the price of the good 
from country j: 
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( ) ikjik ik ij
j
q a p η= ∏
,  
 
where ika denotes benchmark demand as initial prices are normalized to unity. 
 
Suppose countries are symmetric, so benchmark demands are equal (aik = a), as are own-price 
elasticities ( ikk oη η= − ), and cross-price elasticities ( ikj xη η= ).  Then, 
 
( ) ( )o xik ik ij
j k
q a p pη η−
≠
= ∏
. 
 
Now we will distinguish between two country types: a regulating country M within the coalition, and a 
nonregulating country N outside the abatement coalition. Thus, we have symmetric prices for 
exchanges among identical country types, but prices will differ across those types. Let there be m 
countries of type M and hence (n-m) countries of type N. 
 
Simplifying demand, we get: 
 
( 1) ( )
( 1)
( 1) ( )
( 1)
( ) ;
( ) ;
( ) ;
( ) .
o x x
o x x
o x x
o x x
m n m
MM MM MM MN
m n m
MN MN MM MN
m n m
NM NM NM NN
m n m
NN NN NM NN
q a p p p
q a p p p
q a p p p
q a p p p
η η η
η η η
η η η
η η η
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
=
=
=
=  
 
Production of each good is the sum of demand from coalition and noncoalition countries: 
 
( ) ;
( ) .
M MM NM
N MN NN
y mq n m q
y mq n m q
= + −
= + −  
 
We consider competitive markets, where goods are priced at marginal costs plus potential taxes or 
subsidies. Let c(µ) denote production cost, where µ(t) reflects the cost-minimizing emissions intensity 
at the carbon price t. In the benchmark, t=0, with µ0 = µ(0)  indicating the initial emissions intensity 
and 0 0( ) 1p c μ= = . Marginal production costs increase as the emissions intensity decreases from µ0, 
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i.e., c′ < 0. The emissions intensity of production in country i is noted for brevity as µi, and emissions 
in country i are denoted with Ei. Global emissions are then: 
 
( ) ( )= + − = + −M N M M N NGE mE n m E m y n m yμ μ . 
 
The following lemma and assumption will be useful in the subsequent analysis: 
 
Lemma 1: Given any carbon price, t> 0, 01 ( ( )) ( )t c t t tμ μ μ+ > + .   
 
This follows by the definitions of ( )tμ and c(µ)above (and 0 1p = ); as carbon prices are imposed, 
producers in regulated countries respond by decreasing their emissions intensity to lower compliance 
costs.  
 
Assumption 1: Own-price effects are more important than cumulative cross-price effects. (See 
Appendix A for specific mathematical assumptions 1a, 1b, and 1c). 
 
This assumption ensures reasonable demand responses, such that demand declines if all prices go up 
the same amount and raising the carbon price decreases demand for domestically produced goods in 
regulating countries, even if imported goods face border adjustments.1  
2.2 Leakage Metrics 
Fundamentally, the problem of carbon leakage relates to the extent noncoalition emissions increase as 
a result of coalition actions, or 0/N NE E . The overall effect on emissions and the scale by which we 
may judge the importance of leakage also depend on the extent coalition countries reduce their 
emissions, or 0/M ME E . 
 
Conventionally, the leakage rate is defined as the absolute increase in noncoalition emissions relative 
to the reduction of coalition emissions. Formally, we can write this leakage variable, L1, in terms of the 
emissions ratios we just referred to: 
 
                                                     
1 Assumption 1 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for clear comparisons. 
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0 0 0
1 0 0 0
( )( ) / 1 ( )
( ) 1 /
N N N N N
M M M M M
n m E E E E E n mL
m E E E E E m
 
− − − −
= =  
− −  . 
 
We also consider an alternative leakage variable, L2, which is particularly relevant in the case with a 
fixed global cap on emissions. L2 indicates the relative burden of the coalition members vis-à-vis 
noncoalition members in reaching the emissions target—or the relative benefit to a nonmember 
country of staying outside the coalition. It measures the emissions ratio of the noncoalition countries 
relative to the emissions ratio of the coalition countries: 
 
2 0 0
N M
N M
E EL
E E
=
. 
 
In our analytical model, L2 is simplified by the fact that baseline emissions are symmetric, leaving 
2 N ML E E= . We will refer to L2 as the emissions differential. 
 
Both measures increase as emissions outside the abatement coalition increase. However, whereas the 
leakage rate L1 increases with coalition emissions, the emissions differential L2 increases when the 
coalition reduces its emissions. The two variables also differ in their responsiveness to changes in 
coalition membership: all else equal, L1 decreases as the coalition grows, while the coalition size does 
not directly affect L2, which rather expresses average emissions differentials between members and 
nonmembers. 
 
Both metrics are useful indicators of leakage, and in the numerical section, we will present results for 
L1 and L2 when relevant. For the purposes of this section, L2 has the benefit of being more analytically 
tractable. However, we note that in the case of meeting a fixed coalition cap, for both of these leakage 
metrics, comparing policies boils down to simply comparing noncoalition emissions in each scenario.2  
Furthermore, we show that policies with lower noncoalition emissions in the context of a fixed 
coalition cap also must have less leakage than other policies when the coalition targets are adjusted to 
meet the same global emissions cap. This point is important because the cost-effectiveness analysis 
conducted in the numerical section holds the global environmental benefits constant by imposing a 
                                                     
2 Comparing policy g to h, ( ) ( )0 01 1/ / 1 / / 1g h g hN N N NL L E E E E= − − , while 2 2/ /g h g hN NL L E E= . 
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global cap on carbon emissions. We sum up these observations in the following lemmas, which are 
proved in Appendix A: 
 
Lemma 2: In the case of a fixed coalition cap, the ranking of L1 across policies will follow the ranking 
of L2.  
 
Lemma 3: The ranking of L2 across policies under a fixed global cap strictly follows the ranking of L2 
under a fixed coalition cap. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
2.2  Regulatory Measures 
For our assessment of antileakage measures, we start with a reference climate policy in which the 
abatement coalition implements a carbon price through an emission tax (or quota) without additional 
antileakage measures. We then investigate how the addition of alternative antileakage measures—
output-based rebates, border adjustments for imports, or full border adjustments—affect production 
and emissions inside and outside the abatement coalition for three different variants in which the 
carbon price, coalition emissions, or global emissions are fixed at the reference level. The latter two 
variants are useful in analyzing the environmental effectiveness from a coalition view or a global 
perspective—both require the carbon price to adjust accordingly from the initial reference level. 
Carbon Price Alone  
First consider a carbon price, implemented via a carbon tax or a quota market, without any antileakage 
policy (Tax, denoted as T).  In this reference case, producers of goods in coalition countries both adjust 
their emissions intensities and pay the carbon price on their remaining emissions. 
Thus, ,MM NM T Tp p c tμ= = + where ( )T Tc c μ=  and ( )T tμ μ= . Meanwhile, 0 1MN NNp p c= = = . 
 
Simplifying our expressions for output from coalition and noncoalition countries: 
 
( 1)( ) ; ( )o x xT m T mM T T N T Ty na c t y na c t
η η ημ μ− + −= + = + . 
 
Comparing to no policy (where 0 1ijp p= = , and 0iμ μ= , for all i,j): 
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Thus, carbon pricing reduces emissions in the coalition countries by reducing emissions intensity and 
output, while it expands emissions in the nonparticipating countries by expanding output.  The size of 
the coalition (m) strengthens the expansion of emissions in the remaining countries, as does the size of 
the cross-price elasticity (substitutability) of the goods (ηx).  These same factors weaken the emissions 
reductions within the coalition, for a fixed carbon price.  As the coalition size grows, so do global 
emissions reductions. As a result, the overall leakage rate shrinks, but for a given carbon price, the 
emission differential is unaffected by the coalition size: 
 
( )2 0 / ( ) x oT T T TL c t η ημ μ μ += + . 
Carbon Price with Output-Based Rebate 
With output-based rebating (OBR, denoted as R), the prices of goods produced in coalition countries 
do not include the cost of the remaining embodied emissions, but the emissions intensities (and 
corresponding production costs) respond to the emissions price signal. As a result, pMM = pNM = cR, 
where cR = c(µR) and µR=µ(tR), while pMN = pNN = c0 = 1.  
 
Simplifying output: 
 
( 1)( ) ; ( )o x xR m R mM R N Ry na c y na c
η η η− + −
= = . 
 
Here we make the aforementioned distinction as to whether the rebating policy accompanies a fixed 
tax (denoted with superscript Rtax) or a fixed cap (denoted with superscript Rcap). In the case of a 
rebated tax, the emissions price t is unchanged compared to the reference case, so cR =c(µ(t)) = cT. 
Thus, noncoalition emissions are smaller ( RNy  is lower), but so are domestic reductions (
R
My  is higher 
and µM is unchanged): 
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( 1)
1;
1.
x
o x
mRtax
N T
T
N T T
mRtax
M T
T
M T T
E c
E c t
E c
E c t
η
η η
μ
μ
− + −
 
= < 
+ 
 
= > 
+   
 
Given this result, the emission differential L2 is necessarily smaller with OBR, but the net effect of 
rebating on global emissions can be ambiguous. Meanwhile, both emissions ratios above are 
decreasing in m, meaning that an increase in the coalition size tends to lower emissions under rebating 
relative to the reference case for participating and nonparticipating countries. Note that the emissions 
differential is insensitive to the coalition size m (in the fixed price case). 
 
Turning to the case with a fixed coalition cap, the equilibrium price and emissions intensity will adjust 
under OBR to meet the same emissions target as for Tax, i.e., R TR M T My yμ μ= . 
 
Proposition 1: For a given coalition emissions cap, 2 2
Rcap TL L< .  
 
Proof: Suppose that the rebate is implemented with a fixed cap, as with output-based allocation of 
emissions allowances. Because output is higher than with a carbon price alone, to meet the same 
target, emissions intensity must be lower ( R Tμ μ< ), implying that T R T Tc c c tμ< < + .Then we can 
show: 
2
2
1
xmRcapRcap
N R
T T
N T T
EL c
L E c t
η
μ
 
= = < 
+  . 
 
In other words, rebating mitigates emissions leakage, and the magnitude of that effect increases with 
the cross-price elasticity and the coalition size, which together determine the cross-price pressure in 
those remaining countries.3 
 
Now suppose the rebate is implemented with a policy that is adjusted to meet the same global 
emissions target as the carbon price alone—i.e., the policy sets Rμ  such that R TGE GE= . It then 
follows from Lemma 3 that the emissions differential will be lower under OBR. The intuition is that 
                                                     
3 Of course, the carbon price with OBR is a function of the coalition size, so the full effect of expanding the coalition is 
somewhat more complicated. 
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since noncoalition emissions are smaller under OBR for a given coalition cap, the carbon price with 
OBR can adjust downward to loosen the coalition cap and meet the same global emissions target as 
the carbon price alone.  The net effect leaves noncoalition emissions smaller and coalition emissions 
higher, necessarily lowering the emissions differential.  
Carbon Price with Border Adjustment for Imports 
With border adjustment for imports (BAI, denoted as B), coalition producers adjust emissions 
intensities and pay the carbon price, so MM NM B Bp p c tμ= = + . Importers of goods into coalition 
countries pay for their embodied emissions: 0 0MNp c tμ= + .4 Meanwhile, for goods produced and 
consumed in noncoalition countries, 0 1NNp c= = . 
 
Simplifying the production expressions: 
( )
( )
( 1) ( )
0
( 1)
0
( ) (1 ) ( ) ;
( ) (1 ) ( ) .
o x x
x o x
B m n m
M B B B B
B m n m
N B B B B
y a c t m t n m
y a c t m t n m
η η η
η η η
μ μ
μ μ
− + − −
− + − −
= + + + −
= + + + −
 
 
As before, we will distinguish between a fixed carbon price (denoted with superscript Btax) and a 
fixed emissions cap either for the coalition or globally (denoted with superscript Bcap). If we assume 
the same carbon tax rate tB= t, so ,B T B Tc c μ μ= = , then we can easily show that noncoalition 
emissions fall while coalition emissions rise: 
 
( 1)
0
( )
0
( )(1 ) 1;
( )(1 ) 1.
o x
x
Btax Btax
n mN N
T T
N N
Btax Btax
n mM M
T T
M M
E y m n mt
E y n n
E y m n mt
E y n n
η η
η
μ
μ
− + − −
−
−
= = + + <
−
= = + + >
 
 
By definition, then, the emissions differential is mitigated ( 2 2/ 1
Btax TL L < ), but the net effect on global 
emissions is ambiguous. Nor can the effect of import adjustments on noncoalition and coalition 
emissions (and therefore the emissions differential) be easily compared to those under rebating. 
 
                                                     
4 Carbon import tariffs are most likely based on industry-average measures of carbon embodied in imported goods and thus 
will not give a direct incentive for individual producers in noncoalition countries to adjust their emissions intensity so they 
can pay a lower import tax. If they were to reduce their intensity, leakage would decline compared to what we find here. 
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Because coalition emissions rise with the import adjustment given a fixed carbon price, the carbon 
price would have to rise for the case of a fixed coalition cap (i.e., Bt t> , so B Tμ μ< , but implying 
B B B T Tc t c tμ μ+ > + ).  The result is both a higher tax on imports from noncoalition countries and 
more price pressure in those countries to substitute away from goods made in coalition countries. In 
this case, the increase in carbon price mitigates the decrease in noncoalition emissions under a fixed 
tax (see above), with an ambiguous net effect on the emissions differential ratio: 
 
( 1)2
0
2
1 1
( )(1 )
x
o x
mBcapBcap
n mN B B B
BT T
N T T
EL c tm n mt
L E n n c t
η
η η μμ
μ
− + − −
< >
 +− 
= = + +    +  
. 
 
It can be shown, however, that if global emissions decrease when a fixed carbon price is combined 
with border adjustments for imports, the first component dominates the second: leakage is necessarily 
reduced when a fixed coalition cap is combined with BAI. The intuition is that noncoalition countries’ 
emissions do not increase more than the emissions reduction in the coalition countries when the 
carbon price is increased to tB in order to comply with the cap.  
 
The size of the coalition can have ambiguous effects on this leakage ratio: it shrinks the first 
component because exports from the remaining noncoalition countries will be taxed more heavily by 
coalition countries, but it expands the second component because a larger share of the competing 
goods from coalition countries have higher costs. This latter effect is even stronger when compared to 
the OBR scheme because R T Tc c tμ< + .  Thus, it is difficult to rank these two policies in terms of 
their effectiveness in reducing leakage.  However, we see that BAI is more likely to increase leakage 
at higher cross-price elasticities (which raise the second term and brings the first closer to 1) and 
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smaller coalition sizes (which bring the first term closer to 1 more rapidly than the second term). The 
degree of carbon price adjustment also factors in and is endogenous to these other variables. 
 
We conclude that it is difficult to rank BAI vis-à-vis both carbon price alone (Tax) and OBR when it 
comes to leakage. From Lemma 3, we know that this ambiguity carries over to the case with a fixed 
global cap.  
Carbon Price with Full Border Adjustment 
With full border adjustment (FBA, denoted as F), goods produced by the coalition have higher costs 
associated with lower emissions intensities, but only domestically consumed goods pay for remaining 
emissions: MM F F Fp c t μ= +  and NM Fp c= . Imports face adjustment, so 0 0MN Fp c t μ= + , while 
0 1NNp c= = . 
 
Substituting into the production formula and simplifying with our normalization, we get: 
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0
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− + − −
= + + + −
= + + + −  
 
As we compare FBA to Tax and BAI for the variant of a fixed carbon price—i.e., tF = t—we obtain:5 
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Thus, with a fixed carbon price, FBA has a stronger effect than BAI and Tax in terms of deterring 
leakage as well as repatriating output and emissions ( 2 2 2
Ftax Btax TL L L< < ).   
 
The following proposition compares FBA with OBR, saying in particular that the emission differential 
is unambiguously smaller under FBA: 
 
Proposition 2: Given a fixed carbon price, i) Ftax RtaxN NE E< , and ii) 2 2/ 1
Ftax RtaxL L < . 
                                                     
5 Remember that emission intensities are the same across policies when the carbon price is fixed. 
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Proof: We prove i) by using ( )tφ as defined in Assumption 1b, showing that FBA yields 
unambiguously lower emissions than OBR in countries outside the coalition: 
 
( )
1 1
( )( ) 1.x
Ftax Ftax
mN N
TRtax Rtax
N N
E y m n mt c
E y n n
ηφ −
< <
−
= = + <
 
 
We notice that this result gets stronger as the coalition size gets larger.  
 
To prove ii), we first compare the effects on coalition emissions: 
( ) ( 1)( )0
1 1
( )(1 ) ( ) / o xx
Ftax Ftax
mn mM M
T T TRtax Rtax
M M
E y m n mt c t c
E y n n
η ηημ μ − + −−
> <
−
= = + + +
. 
 
Thus, emissions in coalition countries can be higher or lower with FBA than OBR, depending on the 
relative effects of the import adjustments versus the rebate to domestically consumed production 
(exported production is rebated under OBR and FBA). 
 
Turning to the emissions differential L2, by Lemma 1 we have: 
( )
( ) ( )
( 1)
( )o x o x
x
nFtax
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M T
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η η
η η
η
μ − + − ++ −
> +
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Since / 1Ftax RtaxN NE E < , it then follows that 
2
2
1
Ftax Ftax Ftax
N M
Rtax RtaxRtax
N M
L E E
E EL
= < . 
 
Next, we compare FBA to OBR and Tax with the same coalition cap. Given that with the same carbon 
price, border adjustments raise coalition emissions compared to import adjustment, to meet the same 
coalition cap, the FBA carbon price would have to rise ( F Bt t t> > ), but the export price would still 
be less than under the carbon price alone.  The net result is an unambiguous reduction in leakage 
compared to the Tax case. 
 
Proposition 3: Given a fixed coalition cap, 2 2
Fcap TL L< . 
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Proof: Using Assumption 1b, 
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Furthermore, the size of the coalition has an unambiguous effect of reducing this ratio: FBA becomes 
a more effective deterrent to leakage, relative to Tax, as the coalition grows larger. 
 
Due to the effect of the export rebate, we also see that full border adjustment has a stronger effect on 
reducing leakage to noncompliant countries than import adjustments only. 
 
Proposition 4: With a fixed coalition cap, 2 2/ 1
Fcap BcapL L < . 
 
Proof: As F Bt t> , by Assumption 1b,
( )
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2
2
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
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x
mFcapFcap
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Furthermore, we can show that FBA also outperforms OBR with regard to leakage: 
 
Proposition 5: With a fixed coalition cap, leakage is smaller with FBA than with OBR 
( 2 2/ 1
Fcap RcapL L < ). 
 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
 
The following proposition states that OBR leads to higher carbon prices than the other policy 
alternatives, given that coalition emissions are held fixed: 
 
Proposition 6: For a given coalition cap, carbon prices are highest with OBR, then FBA, then BAI, 
then Tax ( R F Bt t t t> > > ). 
 
Proof: The proposition follows from the derivations above (see proof of Proposition 5). 
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To sum up, we have shown that FBA implies lower leakage than all other policies when the coalition 
cap is fixed. It follows from Lemma 3 that under a fixed global cap, the coalition members’ burden 
share of meeting a certain global emissions target will be lowest under full border adjustments. The 
intuition is the following: If FBA has lower noncoalition emissions for any given coalition cap, it can 
relax its corresponding carbon price to meet the global target, which further lowers the emissions 
differential. The ratio of noncoalition emissions falls due to less price pressure, while the ratio of 
coalition emissions rises.   
2.3  Summary of Analytical Results 
Carbon pricing induces leakage, and the extent of that leakage depends on the substitutability of traded 
goods. As the coalition grows larger, the joining country reduces its emissions, but emissions increase 
in countries that remain outside the coalition. If the carbon price is fixed, emissions also increase in 
countries already inside the coalition. In the theoretical analysis of antileakage measures, we have 
distinguished between a fixed carbon price, coalition cap, and global cap, and it is useful to keep this 
distinction when we summarize the results. 
 
With a fixed carbon price, all of the antileakage measures mitigate the increase in noncoalition 
emissions, but coalition emissions are higher than with the carbon price alone. In terms of the 
emissions differential, L2 (as opposed to absolute leakage), we find the same rankings with the fixed 
price and fixed coalition cap policies,6and therefore with the global emissions target. The rankings are 
shown in Table I. 
 
Table I. Relative Emissions Differentials across Unilateral Abatement Policies 
column row
2 2/L L  Tax 
Output-based 
rebates 
Border adjust-
ment for imports 
Full border ad-
justment 
Tax 1 <1 <1 (?) <1 
Output-based rebates  1 (?) <1 
Border adjustment for 
imports   1 <1 
Full border adjustment    1 
 
Thus, in terms of emissions leakage (and global reductions when the coalition members implement a 
cap), FBA dominates output-based rebating and import adjustments, which in turn dominate a carbon 
price alone (given our Assumption 1). The comparison between OBR and BAI, however, is more 
                                                     
6 There is one exception to this: The ranking between Tax and BAI is unambiguous under a fixed price but can be ambiguous 
under a fixed cap. However, if import tariffs decrease noncoalition emissions under a fixed coalition cap, which we find most 
likely, the ranking is unambiguous and the same as with a fixed price. 
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ambiguous: the relative effects of these two policies on coalition emissions (with fixed tax) and 
noncoalition emissions are hard to assess.  
 
The size of the coalition tends to strengthen the expansion of emissions among nonregulating countries 
for a given emissions price, but weakens the emissions reductions within the coalition.  An increase in 
the coalition size does not change the decrease in the emissions differential offered by OBR, but it 
does influence the relative effectiveness of BAI.  For a given coalition emissions cap, the coalition size 
decreases the relative emissions differential under OBR versus Tax, while the effects of the border 
adjustment policies are more complex. 
 
Substitution elasticities also play an important role for the effectiveness of antileakage measures. In 
general, higher elasticities tend to increase carbon leakage. Higher elasticities strengthen the effects of 
OBR on mitigating leakage, whereas the opposite is the case under BAI. The reason is that the effects 
of higher consumer prices under BAI are to a larger extent mitigated when cross-price elasticities are 
increased. 
2.4  Stylized Numerical Illustrations 
Exploring the partly ambiguous implications of antileakage measures on output and emissions within 
and outside an abatement coalition as a function of the coalition size requires numerical analysis even 
for our simple partial equilibrium framework. Here we focus on the case with a fixed carbon price.7 
For our illustrative simulations, we initialize the model with 
0 010, 0.1, 1, 1.1, 1, 0.3, 0.8, 2= = = = = = = =T T on a p c tμ μ η . These settings reflect quite high 
cost increases for a 20 percent reduction in emissions intensity, intensifying leakage and the 
differences among scenarios.8 To explore the role of the substitution elasticities, we consider a high 
cross-price elasticity case ( 0.2xη = ) and a low cross-price elasticity case ( 0.1xη = ). 
 
Our reference scenario is the Tax case, compared with OBR, BAI, and FBA. Figures 1–4 show how 
output, emissions, and leakage measures evolve across the four scenarios as a function of the coalition 
size, as well as the degree of substitutability. 
 
                                                     
7In the CGE analysis, we consider the case with a fixed global cap on emissions as we aim for empirical evidence on the 
global cost-effectiveness and region-specific cost implications of alternative unilateral climate policy designs. 
8 For example, presumptively eligible industries for antileakage measures in H.R. 2454 (House of Representatives 2009) 
would have at least 5 percent energy intensity (or carbon dioxide intensity at $20/ton); few meet the latter criteria, so a 10 
percent cost increase would require a substantial increase—up to 200 percent—in energy costs.   
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Figure 1. Output of Noncoalition Country (Fixed Emissions Price) 
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Figure 2. Output of a Coalition Country (Fixed Emissions Price) 
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Figure 3. Total Emissions 
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Figure 4a. Leakage Rate (L1) 
2 4 6 8 10
m
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
L1
2 4 6 8 10
m0.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
L1
FBA
BAI
OBR
Tax
2, .2o xη η= = 2, .1o xη η= =  
 
Figure 4b. Emission Differential (L2) 
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Following the theoretical propositions, the tax-alone scenario increases output and thus emissions in 
the remaining noncoalition countries as the coalition size goes up (Figure 1).9 Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of antileakage measures increases with the coalition size, with FBA dominating OBR or 
BAI. The relative performance between OBR and BAI is ambiguous for our parameterization: when 
the cross-price elasticity is large, the OBR dominates BAI for smaller coalition sizes, but this reverses 
as the coalition gets sufficiently big. On the other hand, for lower substitution elasticities, BAI can 
strictly dominate OBR, while BAI and FBA can cause noncoalition emissions to decrease vis-à-vis 
benchmark levels.  
 
Antileakage measures repatriate output and emissions to countries within the abatement coalition, 
leading to greater emissions than in the tax-alone case (Figure 2). If the coalition has global coverage, 
emissions in the tax-alone and two border-measure scenarios must coincide because there are no 
                                                     
9 Note that with a fixed carbon price, the emissions intensity in coalition countries is fixed across coalition sizes and policy 
scenarios because it only depends on the carbon price. Thus, the effects on emissions reflect equivalently the effects on 
output. 
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longer countries outside the coalition to which border measures could be applied. However, OBR 
leads to higher output and emissions in this case, a distortion that grows larger as the cross-price 
elasticity declines. 
 
Total emissions across all countries decrease as the coalition size increases—and more so as the cross-
price elasticities shrink (Figure 3). We again see that FBA is unambiguously the most effective 
instrument for reducing global emissions, whereas the ranking between OBR and BAI depends on the 
coalition size and the substitution elasticity. The differences between total emissions under FBA and 
BAI decline as we move toward global coverage, whereas output-based rebate becomes less and less 
attractive as the coalition grows. At the lower cross-price elasticity, OBR actually increases total 
emissions relative to the emissions tax. We also notice that the antileakage measures, especially FBA 
and BAI, have largest effects on medium-sized coalitions. This is intuitive: with small coalitions, the 
effects on global emissions are modest in any case, whereas with small noncoalitions, border measures 
have limited impacts.  
 
Figure 4a depicts the leakage rate (L1) as the ratio of emissions changes in the nonabating countries 
over the emissions reduction in the abatement coalition. The leakage rate is most effectively reduced 
through FBA, while the ranking between OBR and BAI switches from a certain coalition size onward 
when the substitution elasticity is sufficiently high. Furthermore, at the lower cross-price elasticity, 
leakage under BAI is strictly lower than with OBR irrespective of coalition size and is negative when 
the coalition is sufficiently large. Full border adjustments induce negative leakage also with small 
coalitions in this case. 
 
The emissions differential (L2), on the other hand, is less sensitive to the substitutability of goods 
(Figure 4b). FBA is again the most effective policy, followed by OBR up until a sufficiently large 
coalition size, at which point BAI is preferred. Both border adjustment policies become more effective 
at compressing differences in emissions as the coalition size expands. 
3. Applied General Equilibrium Analysis 
Our theoretical analysis provides basic insights into important leakage mechanisms and the 
effectiveness of antileakage measures as a function of the abatement coalition size. But the partial 
equilibrium framework is highly stylized and misses various real-world features that are important to 
draw viable policy conclusions. For example, countries are heterogeneous in production and 
consumption. Economic adjustment to climate policy is driven through complex substitution, output 
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and income effects across multiple markets following changes in relative prices. In particular, terms-
of-trade effects on fossil fuel markets play an important role for leakage. Furthermore, our theoretical 
framework does not feature a welfare metric that allows for a comprehensive cost-effectiveness 
comparison across alternative antileakage policy measures. 
 
We therefore undertake numerical simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium 
model calibrated to empirical data of global trade and energy use to substantiate our theoretical 
considerations. We first provide a nontechnical summary of the CGE model and its parameterization. 
We then describe the scenarios to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative climate policy regulations 
as a function of the abatement coalition size. Finally, we discuss simulation results from which we 
draw policy-relevant insights for climate policy design. 
3.1  Model Structure and Parameterization 
Our impact assessment of unilateral carbon abatement strategies builds on a generic multiregional, 
multisectoral CGE model of global trade and energy use established by Böhringer and Rutherford for 
the economy-wide analysis of carbon emission regulation (see Böhringer and Rutherford 2010 or 
Böhringer et al. 2010 for recent applications). A multiregional setting is indispensable for the 
economic impact analysis of climate policy regimes: policy interference in larger open economies not 
only causes adjustment of domestic production and consumption patterns but also influences 
international prices via changes in exports and imports. These price changes imply secondary effects 
that can significantly alter the impacts of the primary domestic policy. In addition to a consistent 
representation of trade links, detailed tracking of energy flows as the main source for carbon emissions 
is a prerequisite for the assessment of climate policies. 
 
In the following, we provide a nontechnical model summary; the detailed algebraic model formulation 
and graphical exposition of nesting structure in production are given in Appendix B. 
 
The CGE model used for our numerical analysis features a representative agent in each region that 
receives income from three primary factors: labor, capital, and fossil-fuel resources (coal, gas, and 
crude oil). Labor and capital are intersectorally mobile within a region but immobile between regions. 
Fossil-fuel resources are specific to fossil-fuel production sectors in each region. Production of 
commodities other than primary fossil fuels is captured by three-level constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) cost functions describing the price-dependent use of capital, labor, energy, and 
material in production. At the top level, a CES composite of intermediate material demands trades off 
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with an aggregate of energy, capital, and labor subject to a CES. At the second level, a CES function 
describes the substitution possibilities between intermediate demand for the energy aggregate and a 
value-added composite of labor and capital. At the third level, a CES function captures capital and 
labor substitution possibilities within the value-added composite, whereas different energy inputs 
(coal, gas, oil, and electricity) enter the energy composite subject to a CES. In the production of fossil 
fuels, all inputs except for the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource are aggregated in fixed proportions. 
This aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource at a CES. The latter is calibrated 
to be generally consistent with empirical estimates for the supply elasticity of the specific fossil fuel. 
 
Final consumption demand in each region is determined by the representative household who 
maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment and exogenous government 
provision of public goods and services. The household’s total income consists of net factor income and 
tax revenues. Its consumption demand is given as a CES composite that combines consumption of 
nonelectric energy and composite of other consumption goods. A CES function reflects substitution 
patterns within the nonelectric energy bundle; other consumption goods trade off with each other at a 
unitary elasticity of substitution.  
 
Bilateral trade is specified following the Armington (1969) approach of product heterogeneity, in 
which origin distinguishes all domestic and foreign goods except crude oil, where we assume product 
homogeneity. All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a 
CES composite that combines the domestically produced good and the imported good differentiated 
by demand category. As a result, the composition of the Armington good differs across sectors and 
final demand components. The balance-of-payment constraint, which is warranted through flexible 
exchange rates, incorporates the base-year trade deficit or surplus for each region. 
 
The model links carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in fixed proportions to fossil-fuel use with fuel-
specific CO2 coefficients. Revenues from CO2 taxes or the auctioning of emissions allowances are 
recycled lump-sum to the representative agent in the respective region. 
 
As is customary in CGE analysis, base-year data and exogenous elasticities determine the free 
parameters of the model’s functional forms. To this end, the model builds on the most recent Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset with detailed accounts of regional production and 
consumption, bilateral trade flows, energy flows, and CO2 emissions, all for the base year 2004 (Badri 
and Walmsley 2008). Key elasticities in international trade are based on empirical estimates reported 
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by GTAP. The GTAP database is aggregated toward a composite dataset that accounts for the specific 
sectoral and regional requirements of our analysis (Table II). 
 
At the sectoral level, the model captures details on sector-specific differences in factor intensities, 
factor substitutability, and price elasticities to trace the structural change in production induced by 
policy interference. The model identifies the energy goods coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil 
products, and electricity. This disaggregation is essential to distinguish energy goods by CO2 intensity 
and the degree of substitutability. The model then incorporates energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
commodities, which are potentially most affected by unilateral climate policies and thus considered for 
supplemental antileakage measures. These industries are paper, pulp and print; chemical products; iron 
and steel; nonferrous metals (including copper and aluminum); and nonmetallic minerals (including 
cement and glass). The remaining sectors are transport services and a composite of all other industries 
and services.  
 
Table II. Regional and sectoral disaggregation  
Regions   
 EU:  ROW:  A1-Rest:  BASIC: 
European Union OPEC Russia Brazil 
 Other Asia  Japan South Africa 
 US: Other America  Canada India 
United States Other Africa  Australia/New Zealand China 
: Other Former Soviet 
Union  
Other Annex 1  
Sectors 
  Energy:  EITE:  Other: 
 Coal Paper, pulp, print Transport 
 Crude oil Chemical Other industries and services 
 Gas Iron and steel  
 Refined petroleum and coal Non-ferrous metal  
 Electricity Non-metallic mineral  
Notes: EITE=Energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries 
At the regional level, the model identifies all countries that are key players in international climate 
negotiations. The group of industrialized countries includes parties that are listed in Annex 1 of the 
Kyoto Protocol: the European Union, the United States, Russia, Japan, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and other Annex 1. The developing world is represented in part through the so-called BASIC 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), which are incorporated individually. Finally, the 
model captures the rest of the world (ROW) through regional composites for the Organization of Oil 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), other Asia, other America, other Africa, and other Former Soviet Union. 
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3.2  Policy Scenarios 
To assess the economic appeal of additional antileakage measures, we start from a reference scenario 
Tax, where countries forming the abatement coalition levy a unilateral CO2 tax. (Equivalently, these 
countries could establish a joint cap-and-trade system.) We then quantify how economic impacts 
change as we impose the following supplemental emissions-leakage policy measures for EITE sectors: 
i) output-based rebates, ii) tariffs on the embodied carbon of EITE goods imported from nonabating 
regions, and iii) full border adjustments. The implications of the four climate policy scenarios are 
measured with respect to business as usual (BAU) in the absence of climate policy action, defined by 
the economic patterns in 2004, i.e., before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. 
 
Our main research interest lies in the relative performance of alternative antileakage measures as the 
size of the abatement coalition increases from a single country toward global coverage. Given the fact 
that the European Union is pushing most vividly for stringent emission regulations, we take it as the 
starting point for our coalition size variants (coalition EU).10 Next, we consider the case that the 
United States joins (coalition EU+US), followed by all other Annex 1 regions (coalition A1). The 
fourth variant (coalition A1+BASIC) assumes that the BASIC developing regions join the abatement 
coalition, and the fifth variant (coalition All) adds the ROW. In this final variant, leakage by definition 
will not occur. 
 
Considering that the climate is a global public good, a coherent analysis of antileakage measures 
requires that we keep global emissions constant for a given coalition size unless we can value the 
damage from emissions. Acknowledging the huge uncertainties in external cost estimates for climate 
change, we do not attempt to trade off the cost of emissions abatement with the benefit from avoided 
climate change but restrain ourselves to a standard cost-effectiveness analysis. Therefore, we require 
the abatement coalition to adjust its unilateral emissions reduction effort to meet a given global 
emission cap, which is defined as its unilateral emissions target plus the BAU emissions of the 
countries outside the coalition. In our core simulations, we set the unilateral emissions target at 80 
percent of BAU emissions, but to “compensate” leakage, the effective unilateral cap will be lower.11 
                                                     
10 As a matter of fact, the European Union is the only region to date that has adopted legally binding post-Kyoto emissions 
reduction commitments. 
11 Technically, the global emissions constraint requires an endogenous uniform emissions tax across the countries ofthe 
abatement coalition to comply with the exogenous global emissions cap.If the coalition implements its initial emissions target 
as an explicit cap, it must be scaled endogenously to compensate leakage toward the exogenous global emissions constraint. 
In this case, the shadow price of the coalition’s cap corresponds to the endogenous carbon tax under price regulation. 
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3.3  Numerical Results 
Figure 5 illustrates how emissions in three different aggregate noncoalition regions—A1-Rest12, 
BASIC, and ROW—change when the coalition expands and the region in question is still outside the 
coalition. Each line shows the emissions vis-à-vis BAU levels for a given region and climate policy 
but with different coalition sizes. For instance, the line “ROW OBR” shows how the ROW emissions 
change when the coalition expands from no coalition (BAU) to include the European Union (EU), then 
also the United States (EU+US), and so on, assuming the use of an output-based rebate to EITE 
sectors in each of the different coalitions.  
 
Figure 5. Emissions in Nonabating Regions 
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In line with our theoretical findings, we see that emissions in noncoalition regions increase vis-à-vis 
their BAU emissions as the coalition expands. The magnitude of the increase depends on the trade 
intensity with the abatement coalition: because the European Union and the United States are most 
integrated with other Annex 1 regions, the A1-Rest emissions grow stronger for coalitions EU and 
EU+US than those in regions BASIC and ROW. 
 
The figure further shows that emissions in any nonabating region are always highest when the 
coalition chooses Tax and lowest when it chooses FBA. OBR ranges closer to Tax than FBA. Note 
that for the sake of transparency, Figure 5 does not include policy BAI, which is closest to FBA and 
ranks second in reducing emissions increases in nonabating regions. 
                                                     
12 We refer to the composite of Annex 1 regions without the EU and the US as A1-Rest. 
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Figure 6a. Leakage rate (L1)   Figure 6b. Emissions differential (L2) 
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Figure 6a depicts changes in the leakage rate L1. Not surprisingly, leakage rates decline and converge 
as the regional coverage of the abatement coalition expands.13 Consistent with our analytical results, 
FBA is most effective at deterring leakage. While the ranking between BAI and OBR was ambiguous 
in the theoretical model, BAI clearly outperforms OBR in our numerical analysis and is much closer to 
FBA.  
 
The ranking is the same in terms of the emissions differential, but in contrast to the partial equilibrium 
model, which found L2 to be constant or decreasing in coalition size, the CGE model finds that L2 
increases as the coalition grows (Figure 6b). This difference reflects the importance of global fuel 
price changes omitted in our stylized theoretical analysis. International fuel prices become depressed 
through unilateral emissions abatement, which drive up emissions intensities among nonabating 
countries. If this emissions differential represents the cost of joining the coalition, FBA and BAI 
perform the best at supporting a coalition; indeed, the emissions differential with an all–Annex I 
coalition (A1) and FBA is less than that with the EU alone and a simple carbon price. But the increase 
in relative emissions differentials in response to coalition growth in the CGE model may indicate some 
difficulties in broadening a coalition beyond some size, as later joiners are likely to have lower 
willingness to accept costs.   
 
Figure 7 reveals the differences in global cost-effectiveness of antileakage policy measures compared 
to Tax, as well as the global costs of the Tax scenario (compared to BAU). Adjustment costs are 
measured in terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation in income. For global cost-effectiveness 
assessment, we add up money-metric utility with equal weights across all regions, being agnostic on 
                                                     
13 Some reduction in L1 from EU to EU+US occurs because leakage rates with EU unilateral policies are much higher (27 
percent with Tax) than with U.S.unilateral policies (10 percent with Tax). To control for this, if we calculate the weighted 
average of L1 under EU and US, we get leakage rates from 12 percent (FBA) to 17 percent (Tax), significantly above the 
corresponding EU+US leakage rates. 
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the distribution of costs. Global compliance costs to achieve a certain global emissions reduction can 
be lowered if we supplement uniform emissions pricing in coalition countries with additional 
antileakage policies. Figure 7 shows that all antileakage measures reduce global compliance costs as 
long as the coalition is not too big. The basic intuition is that simply replacing production of EITE 
goods in coalition countries by production of EITE goods in noncoalition countries is cost-inefficient, 
especially if emissions intensities are higher in noncoalition countries. Figure 8 reports the shift in 
EITE production from coalition to noncoalition countries while global output of EITE goods declines 
in all scenarios.  
 
Costs are smallest for full border adjustments, which most effectively reduces counterproductive 
emissions relocation through leakage. Having only import tariffs is more costly from a global 
perspective but the cost advantage of FBA over BAI is relatively moderate. OBR still provides some 
cost savings over unilateral emissions pricing only (Tax) for smaller coalitions, but among antileakage 
policies it is clearly the least cost-effective. For larger coalitions, such as A1+BASIC, OBR is also 
more costly than the Tax policy. OBR induces excess costs as they maintain distortionary subsidies for 
EITE production, whereas the cost savings through leakage reduction decline as the coalition expands. 
If the coalition attains global coverage, border measures (FBA and BAI) by definition coincide with 
the Tax policy. 
 
Figure 7. Global Cost Savings of Antileakage Measures, and Global Costs of Tax 
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It should be noted that global cost savings of antileakage policies—measured in percentage of the 
costs of the Tax case—decline markedly as the coalition size expands. With respect to absolute cost 
savings, however, it must be considered that global compliance costs also increase for larger 
abatement coalitions in the Tax case (see the curve in Figure 7). Nevertheless, global cost savings fall 
substantially also in money terms—for instance, expanding the coalition from EU to A1 reduces the 
cost savings of FBA compared to Tax by two thirds (in the former case, the global cost savings are 
US$12 billion). From a broader international policy perspective, the quantitative results raise the 
critical question of whether the overall economic cost savings through antileakage measures outweigh 
the risks and efforts of implementation (including legal disputes and potential subsequent trade wars, 
the costs of monitoring and verifying, and the like).  
 
Figure 8. Output of EITE Goods in Coalition and Noncoalition Countries 
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Figure 9 provides a cost-effectiveness assessment for unilateral climate policies from the more narrow 
perspective of the abatement coalition: what is the minimum cost for the abatement coalition to 
achieve a given global emissions reduction? Border measures still provide non-negligible cost savings 
compared to Tax and OBR (particularly for smaller coalition sizes), but the difference between partial 
and comprehensive border adjustments are smaller than from a global cost-effectiveness perspective. 
In fact, BAI may (slightly) outperform FBA in the simulations because of terms-of-trade effects. The 
abatement coalition is able to improve its terms of trade via border measures, thereby shifting more of 
the abatement cost burden to nonabating trading partners. Export rebates on top of import tariffs might 
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be inferior for the abatement coalition if the reduction in EITE export prices dominates the gains from 
less leakage, which translates into less of an emissions reduction within the coalition. We also notice 
that OBR is more costly than Tax when the coalition is sufficiently large. 
 
Figure 9. Compliance Cost for Abatement Coalition  
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As laid out in Böhringer et al. (2010), the incidence of unilateral climate policies across different 
regions may vary substantially. The economic implications from the perspective of a single region 
capture primary costs of emissions abatement should the country be part of the abatement coalition 
and indirect international spillover effects through changes of terms of trade. The latter effects can be 
substantial and mainly work through price changes in international energy markets (Böhringer and 
Rutherford 2002): the cutback in global demand for coal and crude oil implies a drop in their prices, 
providing economic gains to fossil-fuel importers and losses to exporters. The terms-of-trade effects 
on fossil fuel markets explain most of the welfare impacts for regions outside the abatement coalition 
and can considerably lower or increase the direct cost of emissions reduction for countries within the 
abatement coalition. These effects, however, are fairly robust across unilateral abatement policies for a 
given coalition size because the global emission cap is fixed, and so is the pressure to cut back on 
fossil fuel consumption. 
 
Consistent with Figure 9, border measures remain the most cost-effective strategy across all coalition 
sizes for the European Union and the United States, with hardly any differences between FBA and 
BAI. If we track the changes in the European Union’s adjustment cost over the expansion of the 
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coalition size, we find that emissions constraints in the United States adversely affect the European 
Union, whereas these negative repercussions are slightly ameliorated when all other Annex 1 regions 
join the coalition. Compliance costs in the European Union are then increased again when the BASIC 
countries join. Thus, expanding the coalition has no clear-cut implications for the European Union’s 
compliance costs, and the same pattern is observed for the United States. Again, the magnitude and 
direction of these changes hinge on the trade patterns that the European Union (and the United States) 
have with major trading partners. 
 
Whereas border measures are preferred from a coalition and a global perspective, they are almost 
always inferior to Tax and OBR for nonabating regions. OBR is often preferred over Tax, even for 
noncoalition countries as a group. One example is Canada (see also Figure 10 on China below). When 
the United States adopts a climate policy alone or jointly with the European Union, Canada can gain in 
comparative advantage because the United States is by far Canada’s most important trading partner. 
This is especially true if the United States (or the EU+US coalition) does not apply any antileakage 
measures, or just keeps with OBR. The moderate gains for Canada, however, turn into losses if the 
EU+US coalition levies tariffs on EITE imports—then the United States shifts part of its abatement 
burden via terms-of-trade changes to Canada.  
 
Another example is OPEC, which suffers most in all our scenarios despite being outside the coalitions. 
Due to the depression of the international crude oil price, OPEC’s welfare losses become more and 
more pronounced with the magnitude of the global emissions reduction. OPEC would clearly prefer no 
antileakage measures or output-based rebates over border adjustment policies, as the latter induce 
additional terms-of-trade losses on international EITE markets. 
 
Figure 10 visualizes the adverse terms-of-trade effects for China, the major climate policy player in 
the developing world, if it is outside a coalition of industrialized nations that implements border 
adjustments. If the abatement coalition instead introduces OBR, the Chinese welfare loss is no higher 
than under a tax-alone regime. In reality, China is considering different forms of carbon regulation, so 
it is worth noting that once China joins the abatement coalition, its own preference switches in favor of 
border measures against nonabating regions. 
 
To test the robustness of our findings, we have performed sensitivity analysis with respect to 
uncertainties in the parameterization space. The dimensions of sensitivity analysis include (i) the 
unilateral emissions reduction target of the abatement coalition, (ii) the abatement regulation across 
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coalition members, (iii) the degree of product heterogeneity in traded goods (Armington elasticities), 
and (iv) the price responsiveness of fossil-fuel supplies. We find that all our qualitative insights based 
on the central case simulations remain robust.14 
 
Figure 10. Adjustment Cost for China  
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4. Conclusions 
Various industrialized countries are in the process of legislating domestic emissions regulations to lead 
the fight against man-made climate change. A major challenge in the design of unilateral climate 
policies is the appropriate response to the threat of emissions leakage. Second-best measures such as 
output-based emissions allocation or border adjustments for energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own.  
 
In this paper, we have assessed the relative attractiveness of politically debated antileakage measures 
as a function of the abatement coalition size. We find a robust ranking in terms of leakage reduction 
and global cost-effectiveness with full border adjustment coming first, followed by import tariffs, and 
then output-based rebates. The differences across antileakage measures and the overall appeal of such 
measures decline with the size of the abatement coalition. Whereas border adjustment measures 
                                                     
14 Alternative model and scenario parameterizations involve (i) reduction targets of 10 percent and 30 percent; (ii) 
noncoordinated abatement action across coalition members (compared to the default with intracoalition emissions trading); 
(iii) a doubling and halving of GTAP-based Armington elasticities; and (iv) a doubling and halving of the central-case fossil-
fuel supply elasticities 
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become inactive with global coverage of the coalition, the distortionary effects of output-based rebates 
persist even in the case of a global abatement coalition, without reaping any benefits in terms of 
reduced leakage. 
 
Border adjustment measures for energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors can have substantial 
negative welfare effects for countries outside the abatement coalition due to adverse terms-of-trade 
shifts: while border adjustments clearly dominate output-based rebates from a global or coalition 
perspective, nonabating countries clearly prefer output-based rebates over tariffs and full border 
adjustments if antileakage measures cannot be avoided. 
 
Output-based rebates create economic impacts for noncoalition countries that closely resemble the 
implications triggered by a tax-alone (cap-alone) unilateral climate policy at the macro level. As a 
result, output-based rebates might be more attractive than border measures from a global or coalition 
perspective because the risk of trade conflict is higher if border measures are chosen. Although output-
based rebates perform poorer in terms of global cost-effectiveness than import tariffs or full border 
adjustments, the cost savings of the latter are not huge when compared to potential losses of 
subsequent trade wars. This might explain the lack of border measures in current climate policy 
legislation such as the EU Emissions Trading System.  
 
Independent of the choice of specific antileakage measures, a larger part of the economic impacts from 
unilateral climate policies are transmitted through rather robust adjustments of international energy 
markets, which provide significant indirect benefits to fuel importers and losses to exporters.  
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Appendix A: Supplements to the Analytical Model 
Assumption 1:Own-price effects dominate the cumulative cross-price effects. 
This statement involves three specific assumptions: 
Assumption 1a: ( 1) 0o xnη η− + − < .  
This assumption ensures that demand declines if all prices increase by the same amount. 
 
Assumption 1b: Let ( )( 1)0( ) (1 ) ( ( )) ( ) xo x mn mt t c t t t ηη ηφ μ μ μ− + − −= + + , where (0) 1φ = .Then for t>0, 
( ) 0tφ′ < .  
 
Assumption 1b follows from Lemma 1 and Assumption 1a, which imply that 
( 1)( ) ( ( ( )) ( )) 1o xnt c t t t η ηφ μ μ − + −< + < , so more generally, ( ) 0tφ′ < . 
 
Assumption 1c: Let ( 1) ( )0( ) ( ( ( )) ( )) (1 )o x x
m n mt c t t t tη η ηψ μ μ μ− + − −= + + , where (0) 1ψ =  and 
parameters remain in a range such that ( ) 0tψ ′ < . 
 
Assumption 1c says that as we increase the carbon price t, demand for domestically produced goods in 
regulating countries will fall even if imported goods from nonregulating countries are taxed through 
border adjustments. This assumption will be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for clear 
comparisons. It is simple to show that (0) 0ψ ′ < . Thus, we effectively consider carbon prices and 
abatement costs within a reasonable range in which the first-term effect dominates the second. 
 
Lemma 2: In the case of a fixed coalition cap, the ranking of L1 across policies will follow the ranking 
of L2.  
 
Proof: With a fixed coalition cap, 
j k
M ME E= , for any two policies j and k. Then 2 2/
j kL L =  /
j k
N NE E  
and 
0
1 1 0
( )/
( )
j
j k N N
k
N N
E EL L
E E
−
=
−
. Thus, if  2 2
j kL L<  , 
j k
N NE E<  and 1 1
j kL L<  (and vice-versa). 
 
Lemma 3: The ranking of L2 across policies under a fixed global cap strictly follows the ranking of L2 
under a fixed coalition cap. 
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Proof: The proof follows from the fact that coalition emissions are decreasing and noncoalition 
emissions are increasing in the coalition carbon price, given any policy. If 2 2
j kL L<  under a fixed 
coalition cap, then j kGE GE< . Thus, to meet the same global cap as in policy k, we need to lower 
the carbon price in policy j from that with the coalition cap jt  to jt ′ . This means that 
j k
M ME E′ > . 
Furthermore, with less leakage pressure, j jN NE E′ < . Thus, 2 2 2
j j kL L L′ < < . 
 
Proposition 5: With a fixed coalition cap, the leakage is smaller with full border adjustment than with 
output-based rebates ( 2 2/ 1
Fcap RcapL L < ). 
 
Proof: First we prove that F Rp p< . Assume instead F Rp p= ; assumption 2 then implies: 
 

( 1) ( ) ( 1)
0
1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) 1) 0,
o x x o x x
x x o x
F R m n m m m
M M F F F F F F
m m
F F F F
E E ma p t t n m a p na p
ma t p n m a p p
η η η η η η
η η η η
μ μ
ψ
− + − +− − −
− −
<
− = + + + − −
 
= − + − − <   
 
implying that to meet the same coalition target, a lower t is needed with FBA than with OBR. 
Next, with F Rp p<  and Lemma 1b, we have 
 
( ) ( ) 1.
( )
x
x
mFcap
N F F
Rcap m
N R R
E t pm n m
E n p n p
η
η
φ  −
= + <    
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Appendix B: Algebraic Summary of the Computable General 
Equilibrium Model 
The computable general equilibrium model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. The 
inequalities correspond to the two classes of conditions associated with a general equilibrium: (i) 
exhaustion of product (zero profit) conditions for producers with constant returns to scale; and (ii) 
market clearance for all goods and factors. The former class determines activity levels, and the latter 
determines price levels. In equilibrium, each variable is linked to one inequality condition: an activity 
level to an exhaustion of product constraint and a commodity price to a market clearance condition. 
 
In our algebraic exposition, the notation zirΠ  is used to denote the unit profit function (calculated as 
the difference between unit revenue and unit cost) for production with constant returns to scale of 
sector i in region r, where z is the name assigned to the associated production activity. Differentiating 
the unit profit function with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and 
supply coefficients (Hotelling’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance 
conditions. We use g as an index comprising all sectors/commodities i (g=i), the final consumption 
composite (g=C), the public good composite (g=G), and investment composite (g=I). The index r 
(aliased with s) denotes regions. The index EG represents the subset of energy goods coal, oil, gas, 
electricity, and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels coal, oil, gas. Tables B1–B6 explain the 
notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition. Figures B1–B3 
provide a graphical exposition of the production structure. Numerically, the model is implemented in 
GAMS (Brooke et al. 1996) and solved using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995). 
 
 Zero Profit Conditions: 
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels (g∉FF): 
( ) ( )
KLEM
grKLEM KLE
gr grKLEM KLE KLE
gr gr gr
1/(1 )
(1 ) /(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )Y M M M E E E KL
gr gr gr gr gr gr gr gr grp p 1 p 1 p 0.
−σ
−σ −σ
−σ −σ −σ  ∏ = − θ + −θ θ + −θ ≤   
 
2. Sector-specific material aggregate: 
M
gr
M
gr
1/(1 )
M 1M MN A
igr igrgrgr
i EG
 = p 0.p
−σ
−σ
∉
 
− θ ≤  Π  
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate: 
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( )
E
grE
gr
2 2
1/(1 )
1E E CO COEN A
igr igr r igrgrgr
i EG
 = p p a 0.p
−σ
−σ
∈
 
− θ + ≤  Π  
4. Sector-specific value-added aggregate: 
( ) KLgrKL KLgr gr 1/(1 )(1 ) (1 )KL KL K Kgr gr gr grp v 1 w 0.−σ−σ −σ ∏ = − θ + − θ ≤   
5. Production of fossil fuels (g∈FF): 
Q
grQ
grQ
gr
1/(1 )
1
Y 1Q Q L K FF A
r rgr gr gr gr gr igrgr igr
i FF
 = - (1 )     grp q p 0.w v
−σ
−σ
−σ
∉
+ − θ + +
   θ θ θ θ ≤    
Π  
6. Armington aggregate: 
A
irA A1-1 ir ir
1/(1 )
A A IMA A
igr igrigr ir irigr =  -   + ( )   0.p p p1
σ
−σ
−σ  ≤θ − θ  Π  
7. Aggregate imports across import regions: 
( )
IM
ir
IM
ir
1/(1 )
1IM IM IM
isr isirir
s
 =    p  0.p
−σ
−σ 
− ≤θ  Π  
 
 Market Clearance Conditions: 
8. Labor: 
KL
grKL
grr
rg
 
   Y  L
w
∂ Π≥
∂ . 
9. Capital: 
KL
grKL
grgr
gr
 
  Y  K v
∂ Π≥
∂
. 
10. Fossil-fuel resources (g∈FF): 
Y
gr
grgr
gr
    Q Y
q
∂ Π≥
∂
. 
11. Material composite: 
Y
gr
grgr M
gr
M    Y p
∂ Π≥
∂
. 
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12. Energy composite: 
Y
gr
gr gr E
gr
   E Y p
∂ Π≥
∂
. 
13. Value-added composite: 
Y
gr
grgr KL
gr
KL    Y p
∂ Π≥
∂ . 
14. Import composite: 
A
igr
ir igr IM
g ir
     IM A p
∂ Π≥
∂ . 
 
15. Armington aggregate: 
Y
gr
igr gr A
igr
 
=    A Y   p
∂ Π
∂
. 
16. Commodities (g=i): 
A IM
igr is
ir igr is
g s rir ir
       IMY A  p p≠
∂ ∂Π Π≥ +
∂ ∂  . 
17. Private consumption composite (g=C): 
2CO r2rr gr irCr Cr ir rr gr
g i FF
Y p     +   + q Q p CO Bw vL K
∈
≥ + +  . 
18. Public consumption composite (g=G): 
rGrY   G  ≥ . 
19. Investment composite (g=I): 
rIrY I≥ . 
20. Carbon emissions:  
( ) 22 2
E
gr CO
2r gr igrCO COA
g i FF igr r igr
 
CO   E a
p p a∈
∂ Π≥
∂ + . 
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Table B1. Indices (sets) 
G Sectors and commodities (g=i), final consumption composite (g=C), public good composite 
(g=G), investment composite (g=I) 
I Sectors and commodities 
r (alias s) Regions 
EG Energy goods: coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas, and electricity 
FF Fossil fuels: coal, crude oil, and gas 
 
Table B2. Activity Variables 
grY  Production of item g in region r 
grM  Material composite for item g in region r 
grE  Energy composite for item g in region r 
grKL  Value-added composite for item g in region r 
igrA  Armington aggregate of commodity i for demand category (item) g in region r 
irIM  Aggregate imports of commodity i and region r 
 
Table B3. Price Variables 
grp  Price of item g in region r  
M
grp  Price of material composite for item g in region r 
E
grp  Price of energy composite for item g in region r 
KL
grp  Price of value-added composite for item g in region r 
A
igrp  Price of Armington good i for demand category (item) g in region r 
IM
irp  Price of import composite for good i in region r 
rw  Price of labor (wage rate) in region r 
irv  Price of capital services (rental rate) in sector i and region r 
irq  Rent to fossil-fuel resources in region r (i∈ FF) 
2CO
rp  Carbon value in region r 
 
Table B4. Endowments and Emissions Coefficients 
Lr  Aggregate labor endowment for region r 
irK  Capital endowment of sector i in region r 
irQ  Endowment of fossil-fuel resource i for region r (i∈FF) 
Br  Initial balance of payment deficit or surplus in region r (note: 0=
r
rB ) 
2rCO  Endowment of carbon emissions rights in region r 
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2CO
igra  Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i in demand category g of region r (i∈ FF)  
 
Table B5. Cost Shares 
M
grθ  Cost share of the material composite in production of item g in region r 
E
grθ  Cost share of the energy composite in the aggregate of energy and value-added of item g in region r 
MN
igrθ  Cost share of the material  input i in the material composite of item g in region r 
EN
igrθ  Cost share of the energy input i in the energy composite of item g in region r 
K
grθ  Cost share of capital within the value-added of item g in region r  
Q
grθ  Cost share of fossil-fuel resource in fossil-fuel production (g∈ FF) of region r 
L
grθ  Cost share of labor in nonresource inputs to fossil-fuel production (g∈ FF) of region r 
K
grθ  Cost share of capital in nonresource inputs to fossil-fuel production (g∈ FF) of region r 
FF
igrθ  Cost share of good i in nonresource inputs to fossil-fuel production (g∈ FF) of region r 
A
igrθ  Cost share of domestic output i within the Armington item g of region r 
θ Misr  Cost share of exports of good i from region s in the import composite of good i in region r 
 
Table B6. Elasticities 
KLEM
grσ  
Substitution between the material composite and the energy value–added aggregate in the production of 
item g in region r* 
KLE
grσ  
Substitution between energy and the value-added nest of production of item g in region r* 
M
grσ  
Substitution between material inputs within the energy composite in the production of item g in region r* 
KL
grσ  
Substitution between capital and labor within the value-added composite in the production of item g in 
region r* 
E
grσ  
Substitution between energy inputs within the energy composite in the production of item g in region r  
(by default: 0.5) 
Q
grσ  
Substitution between natural resource input and the composite of other inputs in fossil-fuel production 
(g∈ FF) of region r (calibrated consistently to exogenous supply elasticities)  
A
irσ  
Substitution between the import composite and the domestic input to Armington production of good i in 
region r** 
IM
irσ  
Substitution between imports from different regions within the import composite for good i in region r** 
*See Okagawa and Ban 2008. 
**See Badri and Walmsley 2008. 
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Figure B1. Nesting in Nonfossil-Fuel Production 
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Note: CES=constant elasticity of substitution. 
 
Figure B2. Nesting in Fossil-Fuel Production 
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Note: CES=constant elasticity of substitution. 
 
Figure B3. Nesting in Armington Production 
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Note: CES=constant elasticity of substitution. 
